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Abstract 
In recent years, the study of complex networks has been applied to many areas of research, 
including: mathematics, social sciences, biological systems and computer science.  It is often cited 
that Euler’s celebrated solution of the Konigsberg bridge problem, in 1735, is the first true proof in 
the theory of networks (Newman, 2003) and since this date several ‘notable’ advances in this area 
have been made.  This paper presents some of the more important advances, made in this field, that 
are applicable to the understanding of infrastructure networks.  The European air traffic network is 
then used as an example to demonstrate that graph theory can inform us about the change in 
performance of our infrastructure networks when they are subjected to different types of ‘disasters’. 
 
1 Introduction  
It could be argued that, the first ‘notable’ advance in network graph theory, relating to the 
application of real world problems, is the development of different network models.  The first 
network model developed was the random graph model (Erdos and Renyi, 1960) and has since been 
followed by the small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), the scale-free network (Barabasi 
and Albert, 1999) and most recently the exponential network (Liu and Tang, 2005).  Each of these 
network models has different evolutionary rules for attaching links between pairs of nodes, resulting 
in networks with different architectures (i.e. different arrangements of the links between nodes in 
the network).  The development of these different network models has been driven by the desire to 
model real world networks (e.g. the Internet, social networks) with increasing accuracy.  Today, 
many real world networks can be classified into one of the four main network architectures (classes) 
of network model. 
Another ‘notable’ advance is the identification of the hazard tolerance of each network class.  For 
example, it has been shown that the scale-free network is resilient to random hazard but vulnerable 
to targeted attack when compared to the random network (Albert et al., 2000) and this difference is 
due to their different network architectures.   
This paper expands upon these important advances and considers other more recent developments, 
including the extension of the theory to include spatial and interdependent networks and presents a 
number of examples that demonstrate the utility of complex graph theory in the analysis of these 
networks. 
2 Types of Networks and Network Modelling 
Probably the major contribution of network theory is its ability to describe generic properties of a 
network and in so doing give an indication of the behaviour of seemingly different systems.  
Different types of networks with different arrangements of links (connecting the nodes) have been 
discovered and some of their generic properties described.  The first developed network model was 
the Erdos and Renyi random graph model (Erdos and Renyi, 1960).  This is arguably the simplest 
graph possible (Albert and Barabasi, 2002) and has been shown to be a poor representation of real 
world network architectures (Newman, 2003); however, random graphs are useful and are normally 
used as a baseline for comparison with more structured networks (Lewis, 2009).  An example of 
this can be found in tests for network robustness presented in Batagelj and Brandes (2005).   
 
Figure 1 A sample random network and (b) the shape of its degree distribution (Barabasi and Oltvai, 2004). 
Figure 1 shows a sample random network and its associated degree distribution.  The degree 
distribution of a network is defined as the cumulative probability distribution of the number of 
b a 
connections that each node has to other nodes (see Figure 2 for a further explanation).  From the 
degree distribution (Figure 1b) it can be seen that the nodes in a random graph model tend to have 
the same value of degree (this can also be identified from a visual inspection of the network in 
Figure 1a). 
  
Figure 2 The calculation of degree distribution is made by obtaining the degree of each node.  The degree of 
a node, k, is the number of links attached to this node from other nodes; for example if a node has 3 links 
attached to it, then it has a degree of 3.  (a) Shows a small sample from a scale-free network, created using 
Network Workbench, and shows the degree of each node (the dashed lines indicate links to other nodes in the 
network that have been removed from this figure for clarity).  The degree distribution of the network, P(k), 
gives the cumulative probability that a selected node has k or greater links.  P(k) is calculated by summing 
the number of nodes with k=1, 2,… links divided by the total number of nodes.  It is this distribution which 
allows for the distinction between different classes of network.  The degree distribution for the scale-free 
network (partly shown in (a)) is shown in (b) (Wilkinson et al., 2012). 
To more accurately model real world systems, Watts and Strogatz modified the random graph 
model by using the concept of ‘six degrees of freedom’ (Milgram, 1967) forming ‘small-world’ 
networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).  The main characteristic of small-world networks is that the 
majority of nodal pairs are not directly connected, but can be reached via very few edges.  The 
degree distribution is very similar to that of a random network (Figure 1b) (Barthelemy, 2011).   
Both the random graph model and the small-world network are characterised by a Poisson degree 
distribution (Network Workbench, 2009).  However, Barabasi and Albert discovered that real world 
networks (including, the Internet (Albert et al., 2000) and the World-Wide-Web (Barabasi and 
Albert, 1999, Barabasi et al., 2000) tend to form a power law degree distribution.  Networks that 
follow this power law are more commonly known as scale-free networks.   
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 Figure 3 (a) A sample scale-free network and (b) its degree distribution (Barabasi and Oltvai, 2004) 
These scale-free networks include a small number of highly connected nodes (nodes with a high 
degree) and a large number of poorly connected nodes (nodes with a small degree).  This can be 
seen visually in the sample network shown in Figure 3a and by the associated degree distribution in 
Figure 3b.   
Other real world networks, such as power grids, have been found to have an exponential degree 
distribution and so can be classed as exponential networks (Liu and Tang, 2005).  The origins of 
exponential networks are unclear and no one individual (or group) appears to be cited with their 
discovery; however, they have been used in many studies of real world networks including those by, 
Albert et al. (2004), Amaral et al. (2000), Bompard et al. (2011).   
 
Figure 4 Degree distribution for the North American Power Grid, a real world example of an exponential 
network (Deng et al., 2011) 
The degree distribution for exponential networks is shown in Figure 4; in these networks the value 
of degree for the high degree nodes is lower than that of scale-free networks, but higher than those 
in a random network (for a network with the same number of nodes and links)  (Albert et al., 2004).   
When the previous studies described the various classes of network, they did so assuming that they 
were ‘isolated systems’ - meaning that they were independent of each other and therefore could 
function and grow without relying on resources provided by other systems.  While this assumption 
holds true for the network generation algorithms, to accurately model real world systems it could be 
argued that these systems should be modelled as ‘networks of networks’ (i.e. modelling the 
dependence of one system on another) (Gao et al., 2011, Pederson et al., 2006).  For example, the 
successful operation on an electrical distribution system relies on a supply of water for cooling and 
ICT systems for control and management; i.e. the system relies on other networks to function and 
therefore, when considering its hazard tolerance, should be modelled as a ‘network of networks’.  
Figure 5 shows an example of an interdependent network, where network ‘A’ (show in orange) is 
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connected to network ‘B’ (shown in blue).  The nodes in the system which are reliant on each other 
are indicated by the red dashed lines. 
 
Figure 5 model of an interdependent network, where the ‘A’ nodes belong to one network and the ‘B’ nodes 
to another network.  The single system links in these networks are shown by the solid lines and the 
interdependency links are represented by the dashed lines (Fu et al., 2012).   
3 Previous Research using Network Theories 
Previous research has used network theory to examine the properties of many real world networks, 
including; social networks (Amaral et al., 2000, Newman et al., 2002, Arenas et al., 2003), neural 
networks (Sporns, 2002, Stam and Reijneveld, 2007), biological networks (Rual et al., 2005) and 
computer science (Valverde and Solé, 2003), to name but a few. 
Recently network theory has also been applied to infrastructure networks, aiming to classify them 
into one of the four main classes of network model.  This research has primarily focused on the 
analysis of transportation systems, communication systems and electrical distribution systems 
(power grids). 
Transportation Systems - Subway networks have been analysed and shown to belong to the small-
world class of network (Latora and Marchiori, 2002).  However, within this area it appears that 
airline networks receive the most attention, being analysed at a country (Li and Cai, 2004, Bagler, 
2008, Han et al., 2008), continental (Wilkinson et al., 2012) and whole world (Guimera and Amaral, 
2004) scale.  These networks have been analysed as both un-weighted and weighted network 
models (in the case of the weighted networks, the links are given an increased importance 
depending on the number of flights on a particular day (Chi et al., 2003)).  Both directed networks 
(where the direction of flights between airports is considered (Han et al., 2008)) and undirected 
networks (where only the presence of a flight route is considered (Wilkinson et al., 2012)) have also 
been analysed.  Airline networks cannot easily be placed into a single network class because they 
include elements of both the scale-free and exponential network architectures.  This architecture has 
been classed as a truncated scale-free distribution (or a scale-free distribution with an exponential 
‘tail’).  Figure 6 shows the degree distributions for the airline networks of China and the US.   
 Figure 6 Degree distribution for (a) the China airline network and (b) the US airline network (Li et al., 2006) 
Communication Systems – The Internet and the World-Wide-Web are the two most analysed 
networks within communication systems.  They have been shown to belong to the scale-free 
network class (Albert et al., 2000, Cohen et al., 2000, Albert et al., 1999), the degree distribution of 
the World-Wide-Web is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Degree distribution of the World-Wide-Web (Strogatz, 2001) 
Electrical Distribution Systems (Power Grids) – These systems are perhaps one of the most 
complex human-constructed networks (Costa et al., 2007), comprising of transmission lines, which 
connect power sources (e.g. nuclear power station) to power consumers (e.g. industry and 
residences etc.).  Studies have focused on the analysis of the North American (Kinney et al., 2005), 
European (Sole et al., 2008) and Italian power grids (Crucitti et al., 2004), classifying them as 
exponential networks (Rosas-Casals et al., 2006).  Figure 8 shows the degree distribution for the 
Italian power grid. 
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 Figure 8 Degree distribution for the Italian power grid (Crucitti et al., 2004) 
4 Network Generation Algorithms 
Each of the four main network classes has its own set of ‘rules’ which govern the formation of links 
between pairs of nodes in the network model (i.e. they define how the network ‘grows’ with time).   
Random Networks – The network generation algorithm for random networks is possibly the 
simplest of all the network models.  The network starts with the total number of nodes and each pair 
of nodes is considered in turn and a connection (link) is made between them based upon the value 
of linking probability (the higher this value the more likely it is that a link will be generated) (Erdos 
and Renyi, 1960).  If the linking probability is equal to 1, then the network will be fully ‘saturated’ 
(i.e. it will have the maximum possible number of links) and if this value equals 0 there will be no 
links in the network.  It is possible to have isolated nodes (nodes without any connecting links) in 
the network using this generation algorithm, usually occurring when the value of linking probability 
is very small. 
Small-World Networks – Similarly to the random network model, the algorithm starts with the total 
number of nodes in the network; although, these nodes are connected (via links) to a number of 
initial neighbours.  It is the number of initial neighbours which determines the total number of links 
in the network (as no new links are added).  For example, for a network with 20 nodes and a 
number of initial neighbours as 2, there will be 40 links in the network (i.e. each node starts with 
two links).  These initial links are then ‘rewired’ using a rewiring probability, the higher the value 
of this probability the higher the number of links that are rewired.  Figure 9 shows the effects of the 
rewiring probability, p.  For p = 0 no links are rewired and the resulting network is regular in 
structure, for p = 1 all links are rewired resulting in a random network. 
 
Figure 9 Showing the effects of the rewiring probability (p) in the small-world generation algorithm (Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998) 
Scale-Free Networks – The Barabasi and Albert (1999) scale-free network is based upon the ideas 
of growth and preferential attachment (Boccaletti et al., 2006).  These networks are formed by 
starting with an initial number of isolated nodes, m0 (usually a small percentage of the total number 
of nodes in the network).  New nodes are then added to the network at each ‘timestep’ 
(i.e. ’growing’ the network) until the total number of nodes in the network is reached.  These added 
nodes have between 1 and m0 links attached to them and attach to the existing nodes in the network 
based upon the idea of ‘preferential attachment’.  The probability of attaching to each existing node 
is calculated based upon its degree, with the nodes with a high degree being more likely to ‘attract’ 
a link from the new node (i.e. the rich get richer).  It is this ‘preferential attachment’ rule which 
results in a few high degree nodes and many small degree nodes in the network. 
Exponential Networks – This network class is not as well documented as the other three classes and 
few network generation algorithms exist for creating exponential networks.  However, Liu and 
Tang (2005) propose a model based upon the Barabasi-Albert scale-free network (including the 
ideas of growth and preferential attachment).  In their model, the network starts with a few fully 
connected nodes (m0), unlike the Barabasi-Albert scale-free model in which these initial nodes are 
not connected.  At each ‘timestep’ a new node is introduced to the network with a number of links 
between 1 and m0 (this continues until all nodes have been added to the network).  The idea of 
preferential attachment is still used to connect to existing nodes to in network; however, this is 
modified so that the probability of attachment is not based upon the degree of the existing node, it is 
based on the degree of the connected nodes (to this node).  Meaning that a node with a low degree 
can still ‘attract’ links from new nodes if it is connected to existing high degree nodes.  This results 
in a network where the high degree nodes have a degree higher than those in random networks, but 
lower than those in scale-free networks.   
Until recently, networks have only been generated as topological network models and a spatial 
element has not been considered in their generation (i.e. only the physical connection between nodal 
pairs was considered, not the physical distance between nodal pairs).  However, as the analysis of 
real world networks turns from the Internet and the World-Wide-Web (both requiring only very 
little space to operate) to airline and electrical distribution systems (requiring large amounts of 
space) the spatial element of these networks is becoming increasing important in their analysis.  
Network generation algorithms are therefore beginning to explore ways to include a spatial element, 
using the topological networks generation algorithms as a starting point.   
For example, Gastner and Newman (2006) propose a model for connecting links between pairs of 
nodes, based upon their separation distance.  They include a variable parameter, λ, in their 
algorithm, which is used to simulate users’ preference.  For example, when λ = 0 the resulting 
network resembles an airline network, in which users want to minimise the number of flights in 
their journey; and when λ = 0 the resulting network resembles a road network where users want to 
minimise the length of their journey (Figure 10).  A similar model is constructed by Qian and Han 
(2009), where a variable can be altered and at the two extreme values for this parameter the 
resulting network again resemble airline and road networks. 
  
Figure 10 Generating networks with different spatial layouts, depending on user preference (λ), where: (a) λ 
= 0, (b) λ = 1/3, (c) λ = 2/3 and (d) λ = 1 (Gastner and Newman, 2006). 
In these spatial network algorithms, the locations of the nodes are generally pre-allocated and are 
usually based upon a real system (i.e. the main aim is to define the rules which govern link 
formation between pairs of nodes, rather than to understand the rules that govern nodal location.   
One of the few studies not to have used pre-allocated node locations is that of Wilkinson et al. 
(2012).  In this work they showed that the location of nodes within the European Air Traffic 
Network exhibited a bilinear form; meaning that they were uniform with distance from the 
geographical centre of the air traffic network up to radius of approx. 1,500 km, after which the 
distribution of both airports and their degrees becomes sparser but remains relatively uniform.  The 
reason for this change in grade was because the considered area extended into the Atlantic Ocean in 
the west, and the border of the European Union in the east.  They went on to demonstrate that 
accurate degree distribution could be obtained by randomly selecting nodal locations so that they 
fitted this distribution.  This study also demonstrated that space does play a role in the degree 
distribution of a network as poorly connected nodes can capitalise on their close proximity to a 
highly connected hub by attracting links that were bound for the high degree hub.  This 
modification also leads to the network having an exponential degree distribution. 
5 Hazard Tolerance of Network Architectures and Failure 
Modes 
Studies have shown that each class of network has its own hazard tolerance when subjected to 
different types of hazard.  The two most researched and best documented network classes are the 
random and scale-free networks.   
The random network model is normally used as a baseline for tests of network robustness (Batagelj 
and Brandes, 2005) and responds with the same level of resilience for different types of hazards.  
This is due to each node in the network having approximately the same number of links (and 
therefore the same effect to the network then removed) (Albert et al., 2000).  Whereas the scale-free 
network, has been shown to have different levels of robustness to different hazard types.  This class 
of network is robust to random hazards (which are more likely to remove one of the numerous low 
degree nodes, rather than one of the few high degree nodes) and vulnerable to targeted attack 
(which is likely to remove one of the few high degree nodes in the network) (Albert et al., 2000).   
The robustness of small-world networks is not well documented, however considering the degree 
distribution (which is similar to that of a random network) it could be argued that they respond in a 
similar way to random networks.  Similarly, the hazard tolerance of exponential networks is not 
well documented and could be considered to be in between that of the random and scale-free 
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networks (as exponential networks have high degree nodes with values of degree that are higher 
than that of random networks, but not as high as scale-free networks).   
Studies have also shown that real world networks respond to hazards in the same way as their 
network class.  For example, Cohen et al. have considered the resilience of the Internet to random 
breakdown (Cohen et al., 2000) and to targeted attack (Cohen et al., 2001); finding that the Internet 
(a scale-free network (Albert et al., 2000)) is resilient to random hazard, but vulnerable to targeted 
attack, corresponding with the hazard tolerance of its network class (Albert et al., 2000). 
With the development of spatial network models, the spatial hazard tolerance of these networks is 
starting to be considered (i.e. subjecting spatial network models to hazards that have a spatial 
component).  This hazard tolerance does not necessarily correspond to the topological hazard 
tolerance of the network.  For example, the European airline network is a truncated scale-free 
network and should be resilient to random hazards (Wilkinson et al., 2012).  However, when 
considering the spatial component in both the layout of the network (the nodes and links) and the 
random hazard (which was spatially coherent) in the analysis the results suggested that this class of 
network is vulnerable to spatial hazard.  This is due to the combination of geographical distribution 
and network architectures jeopardising the inherent hazard tolerance of the network (Wilkinson et 
al., 2012).   
The hazard tolerance of interdependent networks has also been considered in previous studies, and 
these networks have been shown to be more vulnerable to hazard (when compared to analysing 
these systems in isolation).  For example, building on the work of Buldyrev et al. (2010), Fu et al 
(2012) coupled two random networks (using a model similar to that shown in Figure 5) and showed 
that interdependent networked systems can be more vulnerable than an individual (uncoupled) 
network.  In this study nodes were removed randomly from the network and the network 
performance was assessed using the relative size, P, of the largest connected component in the 
remaining network (Figure 11, Figure 12). 
 
Figure 11 Performance comparison of an interdependent network against that of a single network, where q 
is the fraction of the nodes removed in the network (using random node removal) and P is the relative size of 
the largest connected component in the remaining network.  Each curve represents the mean performance of 
100 simulations of interdependent networks that couple two 10,000 node random networks (Fu et al., 2012).  
 
 Figure 3: Aggregate performance of interdependent networks A and B when K (the average 
interdependent degree or number of supporting nodes that a dependent node is directly connected to) 
and F (the portion of dependent nodes that a network has) are varied. Each point represents the mean 
performance of 100 simulations of interdependent networks that couple two 10,000-node Erdős–Rényi 
networks (Fu et al., 2012). 
6 Network Measures 
There are two different categories of network measure, one category considers the performance of 
the network and the other category considers the importance of individual nodes in the network. 
In the performance category, there are numerous measures that can be used to show different 
aspects of network performance.  The most commonly used are: 
Shortest Average Path Length (APL) –captures the concept of efficiency in a network (Boccaletti et 
al., 2006).  It is defined as the average number of steps along the shortest paths for all pairs of nodes 
in the network.  The higher the value of shortest average path length the more inefficient the 
network (as on average there are more steps between each pair of nodes).   
Diameter (D) – this is the maximum shortest path length in the network (Boccaletti et al., 2006).  If 
the network is fragmented (i.e. contains groups of nodes that are not connected via links) then this 
value refers to the maximum shortest path length in the largest cluster (Nojima, 2006).   
Number of Clusters (NC) – if the network is fragmented this measure represents the number of 
clusters which contain two or more nodes (i.e. it does not contain isolated nodes) (Nojima, 2006).  
For fully connected network (i.e. one that is not fragmented) this value is equal to 1. 
Maximum Cluster Size (MCS) – the total number of nodes in the largest cluster of the network 
(Nojima, 2006).  For a network that is not fragmented this value is equal to the total number of 
nodes in the network. 
Studies have used these measures to show how a network ‘degrades’ when different attack 
strategies are used to assess hazard tolerance.  For example, Nojima (2006) used these measures to 
show how the Japanese airline network responds to random node removal and preferential node 
removal (based upon node degree, i.e. nodes are removed in order of high to low degree).  This 
study found that removing nodes preferentially degraded the network much quicker than using 
random node removal (the maximum cluster size of the network decreased sharply and the diameter 
and average path length increased noticeably with the removal of only a small percentage of the 
total nodes in the network).  Another study by Albert et al. (2000) also subjected networks to two 
different attack strategies to assess their impact on network performance.  Again, a random node 
removal strategy and an attack strategy (based upon node degree) were used.   
Other researchers have tried to develop more sophisticated measures of establishing the importance 
of nodes, rather than just using node degree.  The most widely used measures are known as 
centrality measures and have been used to show that these high degree nodes are not necessarily the 
most important in the network (for example, Guimera et al. (2005)).   
Betweenness Centrality – is the proportion of all shortest average path lengths between pairs of 
other nodes that include this node (Freeman, 1979, de Nooy et al., 2005) and is based on concept 
that central nodes are included on the shortest average path length of pairs of other nodes (de Nooy 
et al., 2005). 
Closeness Centrality – is defined as the mean shortest path between that node and all other nodes 
reachable from it (nodes that tend to have a small shortest path length between other nodes in the 
network have a higher value of closeness) (de Nooy et al., 2005, Freeman, 1979) and comprises the 
idea of speed of communication between pair of nodes in a network (de Nooy et al., 2005, Cadini et 
al., 2009). 
Centrality measures have been previously applied to social networks (Everett and Borgatti, 1999) 
with the aim of identifying the central person / figure or group / class in a social network.  Recently, 
these measures have also been applied to infrastructure networks (Choi et al., 2006, Crucitti et al., 
2006).  However, these studies do not consider how the services that the network provides flows 
around the network, nor do they stress the network (by removing nodes and / or links) to gauge the 
effect on performance.  It is therefore unproven as to whether the node with the highest value of 
centrality would have more of an effect on the network, when removed, compared to the node with 
the highest value of degree.   
7 Example Vulnerability Assessment of the European Air 
Traffic Network 
In this paper, we demonstrate how graph theory can be applied to an infrastructure network to 
quantify the change in network performance when subjected to different hazards.  We use the 
European air traffic network (Figure 12) and stress the network using four different ‘attack 
strategies’ and quantify the change in performance using four different measures. 
  
Figure 12 Showing (a) the European air traffic network (the black circles are the airports and the red circle 
is the geographical centre of the network, weighted by airport degree, the air routes have been omitted for 
clarity) and (b) its degree distribution. 
The European airline network consists of 525 airports and 3886 air routes and has previously been 
analysed by Wilkinson et al. (2012) and shown to follow a truncated scale-free distribution (Figure 
12b); as such it should be resilient to random hazard but vulnerable to targeted attack.  Nodes are 
removed from the network in four different orders to enable the range of hazards to be simulated: 
 Random Node Failure – nodes are removed randomly from the network.   
 Degree – nodes are removed from the network in the order of highest to lowest degree.  
Previous studies have used this attack strategy to simulate a targeted attack, i.e. the ‘worst 
case’ scenario. 
 Betweenness Centrality – similar to the ‘degree attack’ nodes are removed from the network 
based upon their value of betweenness centrality (highest to lowest).  Previous studies have 
shown that the node with the highest value of degree is not necessarily the most ‘central’ or 
‘important’ node in the network and therefore may not have the largest effect when removed 
(i.e. basing node removal on degree may not simulate the ‘worst case’ scenario).   
 Spatial Hazard – this hazard is based entirely upon the spatial layout of the network (unlike 
the other three attack strategies, which are based upon topological measures).  The hazard 
starts in the geographical centre of the network (calculated using the position of the airports, 
weighted by their degree, Figure 12a) and then ‘grows’ outwards, removing nodes from the 
network in order of their distance from the geographical centre. 
To assess how the network changes (in terms of performance and connectivity) when the attack 
strategies are applied, we use four measures, two describing the connectivity of the network (NC, 
MCS) and two describing the change in network performance (APL, D) (Nojima, 2006).  
  
  
Figure 13 Correlating the percentage of airports (nodes) removed from the European air traffic network, 
when subjected to different attack strategies, and network performance measures: (a) shortest average path 
length, (b) diameter, (c) maximum cluster size, and (d) number of clusters. 
Figure 13 shows the results of correlating the percentage of airports removed, with the performance 
and connectivity measures.  For all measures it can be seen that removing nodes based upon their 
degree or betweenness centrality have similar results (i.e. the red and green lines follow similar 
trends) and the random node failure and spatial hazard attack strategies also follow similar trends 
(blue and purple).   
Considering the network performance measures (Figure 13 a, b) removing nodes based upon their 
degree has the ‘worst’ effect to the network.  Both the APL and D both increase significantly when 
around 20% of the nodes are removed, meaning that the network is now inefficient at transporting 
air passengers.  Then, when around 30% of the nodes in the network have been removed, the values 
of APL and D dramatically reduce.  This is because the network has broken into many small 
clusters each having small APL and D (i.e. the MCS has collapsed - reducing to 15 when 30% of 
the nodes have been removed).  Both the decrease in MCS and the increase in NC (Figure 13d) 
suggest that these two attack strategies quickly fragment the network, rendering it impossible to 
travel to all parts of the network.   
Both the random node failure and spatial hazard, remove nodes that do not significantly affect the 
APL and D (Figure 13a, b); however, the spatial hazard is slightly worse.  Both of these attack 
strategies affect the connectivity of the network in much the same way, i.e. they both cause the 
MCS (Figure 13c) to decrease almost linearly with the percentage of nodes removed and do not 
cause the network to break into a significant number of clusters (Figure 13d).   
From these results it can be argued that the network is vulnerable to targeted attack (based upon 
both the degree and betweenness centrality) when compared to a random hazard.  It can also be 
argued that the network is resilient to spatial hazards; however, these results are misleading as we 
are not plotting the degradation in performance in terms of size of the hazard.  A previous study by 
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Wilkinson et al. (2012) showed that the European airline network is in fact vulnerable to spatial 
hazards as shown in Figure 14; and is a strong argument for further research in determining the 
hazard tolerance of geographically distributed networks.  Other future research that needs to be 
conducted is to assess the effects of edge weighting (i.e. number of flights on each route) as well as 
considering the knock on effects due to interdependence between networks.  For example how are 
other types of infrastructure system (e.g. the train network) affected when parts of the airline 
network are removed e.g. can they cope with an influx of extra passengers due to the cancellation of 
flights, or alternatively can they offer sufficient redundancy by providing other modes of travel.  
 
Figure 14 Plotting the maximum cluster size of the network and (a) percentage of closed airports and (b) 
percentage of closed airspace, when subjecting the network to two types of spatial hazard.  The results show 
in (a) show a similar trend to those shown in Figure 13c, for the spatial hazard, and seem to indicate that the 
network is resilient to spatial hazards.  However, when the size of the hazard is considered (d) the network is 
shown to be vulnerable (Wilkinson et al., 2012).   
8 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented some of the important advances in the field of graph theory and its 
applications to analysing real world networks (including: social, biological and infrastructure 
networks).  We have discussed the current advances and research in the field which aims to increase 
the accuracy with which we can model real world systems. 
We have used the European airline network to show how graph theory can be used to analyse the 
effects of four different ‘disaster’ scenarios.  The simulations presented quantified the change in 
network performance and connectivity and demonstrated that the resilience of this network is 
different for all four hazards.  We have also demonstrated that when considering real world 
networks, it is important to consider the spatial distribution of the network because, not only does 
space influence the architecture of the network, but simple metrics that just consider network 
connectivity may not give the full picture of hazard tolerance.  We suggest that more research is 
required to better understand the hazard tolerance of spatially distributed networks and the influence 
that weighted edges may have on this tolerance.  We also suggest that research is required on how 
other networks may be affected by their dependency on a failed network or conversely, the 
possibility of other networks providing redundancy by carrying the services of the failed network in 
different modes. 
Acknowledgements 
Sarah Dunn is funded by an EPSRC DTA studentship.  The interdependent network analysis wss 
funded through the Resilient Futures project, EPSRC grant (EP/I005943/1). 
References 
Albert, R., Albert, I. & Nakarado, G. L. (2004). Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid. Physical 
Review E, 69. 
Albert, R. & Barabasi, A. L. (2002). Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Reviews of Modern Physics 74, 47-97. 
Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A. L. (1999). Internet - Diameter of the World-Wide Web. Nature 401, 130-131. 
Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A. L. (2000). Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks. Nature 406, 378-382. 
Amaral, L. A. N., Scala, A., Barthelemy, M. & Stanley, H. E. (2000). Classes of small-world networks. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97, 11149-11152. 
Arenas, A., Danon, L., Diaz-Guilera, A., Gleiser, P. M. & Guimera, R. (2003). Community Analysis in Social Networks. 
European Physical Journal B 38, 373-380. 
Bagler, G. (2008). Analysis of the airport network of India as a complex weighted network. Physica a-Statistical 
Mechanics and Its Applications 387, 2972-2980. 
Barabasi, A.-L. & Oltvai, Z. N. (2004). Network biology: understanding the cell's functional organization. Nat Rev 
Genet 5, 101-113. 
Barabasi, A. L. & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 509-512. 
Barabasi, A. L., Albert, R. & Jeong, H. (2000). Scale-free characteristics of random networks: the topology of the 
World-Wide Web. Physica A 281, 69-77. 
Barthelemy, M. 2011. Spatial networks. Physics Reports-Review Section of Physics Letters 499, 1-101. 
Batagelj, V. & Brandes, U. 2005. Efficient generation of large random networks. Physical Review E 71. 
Boccaletti, S., Latora, V., Moreno, Y., Chavez, M. & Hwang, D. U. (2006). Complex networks: Structure and dynamics. 
Physics Reports-Review Section of Physics Letters 424, 175-308. 
Bompard, E., Wu, D. & Xue, F. (2011). Structural vulnerability of power systems: A topological approach. Electric 
Power Systems Research 81, 1334-1340. 
Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E. and Havlin, S. (2010). Catastrophic cascade of failures in 
interdependent networks. Nature, 464(7291):1025-1028. 
Cadini, F., Zio, E. & Petrescu, C.-A. (2009). Using Centrality Measures to Rank the Importance of the Components of a 
Complex Network Infrastructure. In: Setola, R. & Geretshuber, S. (eds.) Critical Information Infrastructure Security. 
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. 
Chi, L. P., Wang, R., Su, H., Xu, X. P., Zhao, J. S., Li, W. & Cai, X. (2003). Structural properties of US flight network. 
Chinese Physics Letters 20, 1393-1396. 
Choi, J. H., Barnett, G. A. & Chon, B. S. (2006). Comparing world city networks: a network analysis of Internet 
backbone and air transport intercity linkages. Global Networks-a Journal of Transnational Affairs 6, 81-99. 
Cohen, R., Erez, K., Ben-Avraham, D. & Havlin, S. (2000). Resilience of the Internet to random breakdowns. Physical 
Review Letters 85, 4626-4628. 
Cohen, R., Erez, K., Ben-Avraham, D. & Havlin, S. (2001). Breakdown of the internet under intentional attack. 
Physical Review Letters 86, 3682-3685. 
Costa, L. F., Oliveira, O. N., Travieso, G., Rodrigues, F. A., Boas, P. V., Antiqueira, L., Viana, M. & Rocha, L. E. C. D. 
(2007). Analyzing and Modeling Real-World Phenomena with Complex Networks: A Survey of Applications. Physics, 
103. 
Crucitti, P., Latora, V. & Marchiori, M. (2004). A topological analysis of the Italian electric power grid. Physica a-
Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 338, 92-97. 
Crucitti, P., Latora, V. & Porta, S. (2006). Centrality in networks of urban streets. Chaos, 16. 
De Nooy, W., Mrvar, A. & Batagelj, V. (2005). Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Deng, W., Li, W., Cai, X. & Wang, Q. A. (2011). The exponential degree distribution in complex networks: Non-
equilibrium network theory, numerical simulation and empirical data. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications 390, 1481-1485. 
Erdos, P. & Renyi, A. (1960). On The Evolution of Random Graphs. Publication of the Mathematical Institutre of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 5, 17-61. 
Everett, M. G. & Borgatti, S. P. (1999). The centrality of groups and classes. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 23, 
181-201. 
Freeman, L. C. 1979. Centrality In Social Networks Conceptual Clarification. Social Networks 1, 215-239. 
Fu G, Khoury M, Dawson R, Bullock S (2012) Vulnerability Analysis of Interdependent Infrastructure Systems, in 
Proc. 2012 European Conference on Complex Systems. 
Gao, J., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S. & Stanley, H. E. (2011). Robustness of a Network of Networks. Physical Review 
Letters 107, 195701. 
Gastner, M. T. & Newman, M. E. J. (2006). The spatial structure of networks. European Physical Journal B 49, 247-
252. 
Guimera, R. & Amaral, L. A. N. (2004). Modeling the world-wide airport network. European Physical Journal B 38, 
381-385. 
Guimera, R., Mossa, S., Turtschi, A. & Amaral, L. A. N. (2005). The worldwide air transportation network: Anomalous 
centrality, community structure, and cities' global roles. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 102, 7794-7799. 
Han, D. D., Qian, J. H. & Liu, J. G. 2008. Network Topology Of The Austrain Airline Flights. 
Kinney, R., Crucitti, P., Albert, R. & Latora, V. (2005). Modeling cascading failures in the North American power grid. 
The European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 46, 101-107. 
Latora, V. & Marchiori, M. (2002). Is the Boston subway a small-world network? Physica a-Statistical Mechanics and 
Its Applications 314, 109-113. 
Lewis, T. G. (2009). Network science: theory and practice, John Wiley & Sons. 
Li, W. & Cai, X. 2004. Statistical analysis of airport network of China. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 69, 
046106. 
Li, W., Wang, Q. A., Nivanen, L. & Le Mehaute, A. 2006. How to fit the degree distribution of the air network? 
Physica a-Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 368, 262-272. 
Liu, J. Z. & Tang, Y. F. (2005). An exponential distribution network. Chinese Physics 14, 643-645. 
Milgram, S. (1967). The Small-World Problem. Psychology Today 1, 61-67. 
Network Workbench (2009). Network Workbench Tool: User Manual 1.0.0. 
Newman, M. E. J. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. Siam Review 45, 167-256. 
Newman, M. E. J., Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H. (2002). Random graph models of social networks. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99, 2566-2572. 
Nojima, N. (2006). Evaluation of Functional Performance of Complex Networks for Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
First European Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Seismology. Geneva, Switzerland. 
Pederson, P., Dudenhoeffer, D., Hartley, S. & Permann, M. (2006). Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling: A 
Survey of U.S. and International Research. Idaho: Idaho National Laboratory. 
Qian, J. H. & Han, D. D. (2009). A spatial weighted network model based on optimal expected traffic. Physica a-
Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 388, 4248-4258. 
Rosas-Casals, M., Valverde, S. & Sole, R. V. (2006). Topological Vulnerability of the European Power Grid under 
Errors and Attacks. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 17, 2465-2475. 
Rual, J.-F., Venkatesan, K., Hao, T., Hirozane-Kishikawa, T., Dricot, A., Li, N., Berriz, G. F., Gibbons, F. D., Dreze, 
M., Ayivi-Guedehoussou, N., Klitgord, N., Simon, C., Boxem, M., Milstein, S., Rosenberg, J., Goldberg, D. S., Zhang, 
L. V., Wong, S. L., Franklin, G., Li, S., Albala, J. S., Lim, J., Fraughton, C., Llamosas, E., Cevik, S., Bex, C., Lamesch, 
P., Sikorski, R. S., Vandenhaute, J., Zoghbi, H. Y., Smolyar, A., Bosak, S., Sequerra, R., Doucette-Stamm, L., Cusick, 
M. E., Hill, D. E., Roth, F. P. & Vidal, M. (2005). Towards a proteome-scale map of the human protein-protein 
interaction network. Nature 437, 1173-1178. 
Sole, R. V., Rosas-Casals, M., Corominas-Murtra, B. & Valverde, S. (2008). Robustness of the European power grids 
under intentional attack. Physical Review E, 77. 
Sporns, O. (2002). Network analysis, complexity, and brain function. Complexity 8, 56-60. 
Stam, C. J. & Reijneveld, J. C. (2007). Graph Theoretical Analysis of Complex Networks in the Brain. Nonlinear 
Biomedical Physics 1, 1-19. 
Strogatz, S. H. (2001). Exploring complex networks. Nature 410, 268-276. 
Valverde, S. & Solé, R. V. (2003). Hierarchical small worlds in software architecture. Arxiv preprint cond-mat/0307278. 
Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H. (1998). Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks. Nature 393, 440-442. 
Wilkinson, S., Dunn, S. & Ma, S. (2012). The vulnerability of the European air traffic network to spatial hazards. 
Natural Hazards 60, 1027-1036. 
 
